The fiscal decentralisation architecture under the 1996 Constitution of Cameroon, by Chofor Che CA, 3 May 2023

Finances are a decisive factor of any decentralisation process. This contribution examines the financial decentralisation framework under the 1996 Constitution of Cameroon, with some attention placed on local government’s own revenue and transfers from the Special Council Support Fund for Mutual Assistance (with French acronym FEICOM).

In Cameroon, the central government has responsibility over taxes on international transactions, like customs duties, and a considerable share of income and general sales taxes, such as value-added tax (VAT). The VAT was introduced in 1998. Reforms also created specialised units for the taxation of specific sectors, such as fisheries, forestry and cattle. But data-sharing and coordination between social security authorities, customs and tax experts have not been successful, albeit that since mid-1996 there have been irrefutable progress, including a steady increase in fiscal revenue figures (excluding oil revenue figures) and in the number of taxpayers. However, these improvements have been judged as inadequate, especially given that the Anglophone regions remain in conflict and underdeveloped with poor road infrastructure.[1] 

The 1996 Constitution of Cameroon accords minimal financial autonomy to the regions and municipal councils. Financial decisions are taken by the central government and imposed on the regions and municipal councils. The main instrument governing financial issues under the decentralisation architecture is Law No. 2009/011 of 10 July 2009 relating to Financial Regime of Regional and Local Authorities. In section 2, it purports inter alia to give local government authorities ‘financial autonomy for the management of regional or local interests’.[2] The regions in Cameroon depend on grants and financial transfers from the central government. Regions are not consulted in the central government’s budgeting process, on which they consequently remain dependent. Custom duties as well as major taxes are collected by the central government and distributed to the regions and councils. Local governments, for instance, are left with little but market fees, business licenses, property tax and user charges. The 1996 Constitution therefore allows for a centralised system of government, where funds especially taxes collected are transferred from the central government to regions and councils.[3]

Despite fundamental reforms of the central government tax system during the last two decades, regional and local government tax systems remain greatly ignored. The local tax systems are often expensive to manage and serve to worsen inequity. Generally, there is little coordination in taxation between different spheres of government, which to some degree has to do with lack of skills and capacity. This has led to double-taxation of the same revenue base as well as discrepancies between local and central-government tax policies.[4]

While the present capacity for most rural councils and regions in Cameroon to raise considerable own revenues is limited, the ability for revenue augmentation in urban councils in the administrative capitals of some regions is better. However, one main hurdle today for several municipalities in regions in Cameroon is their inability to make full collection of revenue due to them, which is evident in the huge gaps between reported and projected revenues. This is as a result of the porous administrative propensity for enforcing the payment of taxes and for assessing the revenue base; embezzlement of revenue; corruption; external pressure on local finance departments to provide realistic prognoses; and political pressure on local tax administrations to relax revenue collection, particularly so during election periods.[5]

FEICOM’s major revenue role is the centralised collection and redistribution of the Additional Council Tax levy (Centimes Additionnels Communaux, or CAC). CAC is a 10 percent levy on certain types of national taxation which is apportioned for the financing of council activities. Taxes to which this levy is applied include entertainment tax, general income tax, business tax and VAT. The distorted manner of revenue distribution, along with the widely varying circumstances of individual councils, has led to significant inequalities in the way in which resources are distributed.[6]

Local government accepts block grant revenue from the central government, which is paid to them through FEICOM. These grants are supposed to be weighted according to the council’s surface area, population and other considerations. FEICOM also provides councils with non-financial support, including project evaluation and expert technical assistance.

Structures such as the Directorate General (DG) of the Budget, the DG of Taxation, and the DG of the Treasury help FEICOM in the collection, centralisation and redistribution of taxes. Other institutions such as the National Anti-Corruption Commission and the Ministry of Supreme State Control need to assist FEICOM in ensuring that taxes are used judiciously in the decentralisation process. However, these structures have not been able to assist FEICOM sufficiently in making sure that resources are shared equitably among local governments. In addition to this inequitable allocation of resources, embezzlement and corruption remain acute.

It has been established that the fiscal decentralisation agenda under the 1996 Constitution is porous and needs reform. It is therefore necessary to bring in the case of South Africa with respect to how adequate fiscal and resource autonomy may contribute in a rationalised decentralisation design for reinforced administrative and political autonomy. This may better inform constitution builders in creating a more appropriate decentralisation design for Cameroon.  South Africa allows local government to raise their own finances. The 1996 Constitution of South Africa states that the designation of political and administrative functions and powers to lower spheres of government must be accompanied by adequate financial means.[7]

In most decentralised countries, fiscal design options have three main elements. The first is intergovernmental transfers and focuses on how various spheres of government equalise imbalances and share revenues. The second is the assignment of responsibility to a sphere or spheres of government to raise revenue.[8] The third element is the assignment of responsibility for expenditure on services and the like at the various spheres of government. To guarantee that the administration successfully carries out its responsibilities, the propensity to assign duties and competencies must follow or accompany the assignment of responsibility for expenditure. If all taxing responsibility is conferred on the central government, this may result in undesirable consequences.[9] For instance, by separating spending powers from the revenue-raising authority may obscure the link between the benefits or gains of public expenditure and its cost, which are the taxes levied to finance them, so that the separation does not encourage fiscal responsibility among politicians and their electorate at the local level.[10] If the constitution gives too much responsibility for raising taxes to local government, the central government may have issues with macro-economic development planning.[11]

It thus is necessary for constitution builders to additionally take into consideration two main factors when deciding whether to give the tax raising and spending responsibility to local government. First, revenues attributed to the local governments should be adequate to finance all locally-provided services that primarily benefit local inhabitants.[12] Second, local government should be given the permission to collect sub-national revenues from their local residents linked to benefits obtained from local services. Making sure that there is a connection between benefits received and taxes paid strengthens the accountability of local administrators and equally governmental service delivery.[13]

A disparity often exists between taxing and spending at the various spheres of government, particularly lower spheres of government, in that the central government usually collects the greatest share of taxes but allocates enormous spending responsibilities to the local level.[14] Pre-transfer fiscal deficits, also termed vertical imbalances, occur. Horizontal imbalances, which are imbalances between lower spheres of government, equally exist.[15] Usually lower spheres of government are not assigned with the same revenue raising abilities, especially as wealthy residents cannot live in every region or local government, nor do they all have the same needs. Some lower spheres of government are more populated than others while others demand more services than others. To adjust such imbalances, there thus is a need for intergovernmental transfers, vertically.[16] If the payments are from the central government to lower spheres of government, then there is need for intergovernmental transfers, horizontally, if these transfers are between sub-national governments.[17] There may similarly be grants transferred from the central government to lower spheres of government, which may go a long way towards giving adequate autonomy to local government in countries.[18] Such arrangements are necessary for local government in Cameroon especially local government in the special status regions. There is no gainsaying that the government of Cameroon has made some efforts in ensuring that local government has some degree of autonomy, but more still has to be done as in the case of South Africa.

It is very necessary for the role of the Presidency, the Prime Ministry, the Ministry of Decentralisation and Local Development, as well as other concerned line ministries to accompany FEICOM in the fiscal decentralisation process of the country. This is same with other units such as the National Anti-Corruption Agency with French acronym CONAC, the directorate-general of customs, taxation and the budget. If this done it may go a long way to reduce resource wastage as well as curb corruption so as to enhance better political and administrative decentralisation.

Chofor Che CA is Technical Adviser no 2 at the National School of Local Administration , Buea, Cameroon. He is co-founder of CACLiTA. He holds a PhD (Law) obtained from the Centre for Human Rights, Faculty of Law, South Africa. In 2023, he was guest researcher at the Institute of Federalism , Faculty of Law, University of Fribourg, Switzerland. He has served before as Divisional Officer in Cameroon (appointed by the President of the Republic) and consulted for several international institutions.

[1] Muñoz, J.M., Business Visibility and Taxation in Northern Cameroon African Studies Review 53 (2) 2010, 153.  See also Mafany, C.N., The Anglophone-Cameroonian Armed Conflict in North and South West Regions of Cameroon: The Rulings of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, Commonwealth Journal of Academic Research, 1 (1) 2020, 3. .

[2] Section 2 of Law No. 2009/011 of 10 July 2009 relating to Financial Regime of Regional and Local Authorities (2009 Decentralisation Finance Law).

[3] Fombad, C.M., Cameroon and the Anomalies of Decentralisation with a Centralist Mindset. in C.M. Fombad & N. Steytler (ed.), Decentralisation and Constitutionalism in Africa, Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2019, 345.

[4] Ndonwi, A.K., The Tax Regime in Cameroon and The Responsibilities of Cameroonians Towards Fiscal Tax Allocations, November 30, 2019, available at  (accessed 12 April 2023).

[5]OCHA Cameroon, Situation Report, 9 March 2022. available at (accessed 12 April 2023).

[6] CAC revenue is allocated as follows: 10 percent is attributed to the central government, 20 percent remains with FEICOM, and 70 percent goes to councils. Of the total allocated to councils, 20 percent goes to Douala, the economic capital of Cameroon; 40 percent goes to Yaoundé and 36 percent to other councils. The remaining 4 percent is retained by FEICOM and utilised for various activities, for instance to support infrastructure projects in border councils, to help councils affected by natural disaster, or to compensate councils for revenue paid beyond their borders. In addition, 40 percent of forestry royalties are allocated to councils on a per capita basis.

[7] Section 214 (2) (d) of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996.

[8] Shah, A., The Reform of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Developing and Emerging Market Economies, The World Bank: Washington DC, 1994, 15-18.

[9] Anderson, G., Fiscal Federalism: A Comparative Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2010, 2-3.

[10] Shah (1994) 15- 18.

[11] Anderson (2010) 2-3.

[12] Anderson, G., Federalism: An Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2008, 35-36.

[13] Anderson (2010) 41.

[14] Anderson (2010) 34.

[15] Anderson (2010) 6.

[16] Bird, R.M., Subnational Taxation in Developing Countries: A Review of the Literature, Policy Research Working Paper 5450 World Bank: Washington, DC, 2010.1.

[17]Ahmad, E., Intergovernmental Transfers: An International Perspective, in E. Ahmed (ed.), Financing Decentralised Expenditures: An International Comparison of Grants, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 1997, 6. Transfers may be in the form of either revenue-sharing or surcharges whereby the national government transfers a share of revenues from specific taxes collected within that local government.

[18] Anderson (2010) 58.

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Posted by on May 3, 2023 in Uncategorized


An examination of devolved powers to Regions in Cameroon concerning the domain of secondary education, by Paul Nana Simo, Esq., 1 May 2023

In matters of devolution (to subnational tiers of Government, notably Regions and Councils), there is intention and then reality. When the latter sets in, then intentions may remain just that. 

Presidential decree 2023/223 of 27April 2023 to lay down conditions governing the exercise of some powers devolved by the State upon regions in the area of secondary education, falls in precisely that category. Keen readers would have noticed that Articles 2, 3, and 19 (2) of the decree are its key provisions. 

Article 2 spells out what Regional institutions will do in the domain of Secondary education. Article 3 contains a very important (and long) list of things Regional institutions emphatically are *not* allowed to do on Secondary education, while Article 19 (2) says any power Regions were given (promised) over Secondary education in the 2019 Devolution Law (Code on Regional and Local Authorities) not presently transferred to them, will be devolved “gradually”. 

If one compares Article 2 of this law with Section 272 of the  2019 Devolution Code, there is one missing power or competency among those transferred to Regions : it is the power to recruit and pay *teaching* staff at Secondary schools. Regions per this 2023 decree can recruit support or non-academic staff, and part-time teachers to supplement schools, but the core trunk of State secondary school teaching personnel will be recruited and paid for by the central State and not devolved to the Regions, until further notice. The 2019 Devolution Code therefore promised what cannot now be delivered. 

A few strategic observations. Lawyers may argue over the elegance of the President of the Republic super-imposing by Decree, a “gradual implementation” timeline on a matter which the Legislature voted on, in 2019. And, the powers of Regional and Local Authorities, as well as the domain of Education are within the preserve of the Legislative Branch to lay down laws, under Section 26 of the Constitution. (They are not in the President’s constitutional domain to rule by decree). Would it not have been proper in respect of the separation of powers for a modification bill to the 2019 Devolution Code to have been tabled to Parliament, expressly holding back the transfer of recruitment and payment of State secondary school teachers to Regions, for explicit reasons? 

That certainly would have provoked some public debate. The reasons for the gradualism on this power are multiple. State secondary school teachers are the single largest workforce in Cameroon’s civil service. In the 2018-19 academic year, they totalled in number 67, 964 teachers. Managing recruitment, payroll administration, and substantive oversight of that vast teaching corps has been Ministry of Secondary Education’s (MINESEC) function. 

To shift that function to newly established regions would be a challenge, despite potential efficiency gains from “splitting” their management to 10 more proximate Regional Institutions. Necessarily though, it would have required that the Regional institutions acquire substantially more human resource (teacher) management capabilities. Central teacher management has not been easy either, with the constant MINESEC – Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reforms (MINFOPRA) struggles to calm down restive new teacher appointees unable to get paid or compile their administrative paperwork. 

In the devolution debate, an “ugly” issue reared its head, when some commentators opined that the idea of devolving functions like Teacher recruitment, management, and payment would be a disaster, because all Regions would “tribalize” recruitment, and grant teaching posts only to persons from the said region – discounting the Regions’ sociological composition, actual or intended residence, or the teacher needs of schools in the Region. (Over time, that matter would need guidance applicable to local councils as well, to ensure that their recruitment or service provision does not turn them into ethnic enclaves. That can be regulated and enforced by law). 

Finally, a transfer of recruitment and payment of State secondary teachers to the Regions would have meant that the State’s largest recurrent budget item (MINESEC’s payment of its teachers) would have shifted from the central State to Regions. In the 2023 budget, that would have been 451 billion, out of the total 4,888 billion recurrent expenses budget (9.2%). On the one hand, it would have constituted a quantum leap towards attaining the 15% of State expenditure to be effected by Regions and Local Councils, per the 2019 Devolution Law. On the other hand, it would have dwarfed Regions’ existing budget allocations, in one go. 

This therefore raises the question of how the 15% target sits with the Law retaining the principle of transferring secondary education teachers to the Regions, even if “gradually”. Is the gradualism in reality a _calendrier grec_ , because on its own, that transfer will shift so much resources to the Regional Tier? If Basic Education teachers (251 billion in salaries per 2023 recurrent budget) were further transferred to Municipal Councils, that would overshoot the 15% target. And that is before health and other competencies are further devolved. 

There are some lessons there to be learnt, on devolution planning, sequencing, and timelines. 

Paul Nana Simo, Esq is Principal Researcher & Analyst at the Centre for Law and Public Policy based in Cameroon. He is a graduate of the US based Notre Dame University and an attorney in Douala admitted in the Third Judicial Department (seated in Albany) of New York State in 2001, registered with the Office of Court Administration (OCA) of New York State Unified Court System. He is a conflict, human rights, governance, and policy professional with over 20 years of experience working on countries in East, Central, and West Africa. He has worked with international non-governmental, inter-governmental (U.N. field presences and peacekeeping operations), and national civil society organizations. His professional experience spans from countries like Uganda, Burundi, DR Congo, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cameroon, Chad, CAR, Switzerland, UK and the USA.

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Posted by on May 1, 2023 in Uncategorized


238 – Il comune povero- ‘The poor municipality’ — Local Government Utopia

1600 words (15 minutes reading time) by Colin Weatherby                                                                                                                 Great post by Lancing Farrell. I like the link to the creative and enduring solutions people have devised in response to food scarcity. Human ingenuity can be a marvellous thing. The impact of declining financial sustainability on asset management is disturbing. As anyone directly responsible for […]

238 – Il comune povero- ‘The poor municipality’ — Local Government Utopia
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Posted by on April 24, 2023 in Uncategorized


Women’s right of inheritance of property:  Perspectives of a female lawyer from South Sudan — AfricLaw

Author: Cedonia Victor LeggeAdvocate and LLM scholar, University of Juba Introduction Women in South Sudan make up more than half the country’s population, yet they have the least influence in the society ¾ especially in the right of access to property ¾ movable and immovable. Whereas the law guarantees the right of women to inherit property, patriarchal traditions continue […]

Women’s right of inheritance of property:  Perspectives of a female lawyer from South Sudan — AfricLaw
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Posted by on April 24, 2023 in Uncategorized


Employment Opportunity – Liverpool City Council 📣‼️ — Local Government Landscape Design Forum (NSW)

Liverpool City Council has created a new Senior Urban Design Advisor role, within its passionate, energetic and supportive City Design and Public Domain team. If you’re a Landscape Architect, Architect, or Urban Designer that’s interested in helping shape the significant growth and development occurring, in one of the fastest growing and most culturally diverse regions […]

Employment Opportunity – Liverpool City Council 📣‼️ — Local Government Landscape Design Forum (NSW)
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Posted by on April 24, 2023 in Uncategorized


Supervision and inter-governmental relations in Cameroon’s decentralisation process, by Chofor Che CA, 24 April 2023

The 1996 Constitution of Cameroon (the 1996 Constitution) makes provision for decentralisation of powers via the creation of regional and local authorities. In its Article 1 (2), the 1996 Constitution, stipulates that: “Cameroon shall be a Decentralised Unitary State”.  The country is divided into ten regions with appointed Governors at the helm who coordinate the activities of appointed Senior Divisional Officers (SDOs) or Prefects and Divisional Officers (DOs) or Sub-Prefects. Alongside these appointees, are elected mayors, city mayors and presidents of regional councils and assemblies.

At the institutional level, and in line with Article 55 of the 1996 Constitution, regions and councils constitute the two forms of Regional and Local Authorities (RLAs) of the State of Cameroon.  The council is a legal entity under public law. Created by the President of the Republic, it is administered by two bodies, a municipal council and a council executive, both elected, except in case of special delegation. In its current state, the country is endowed with 315 councils; 45 divisional councils and 14 city councils. Making a total of 374 councils and city councils. The region constitutes second level of Cameroon’s decentralisation architecture. It is a regional and local administration made up of several departments and entrusted with a general mission of economic and social progress. Its advent dates from the 18 January 1996 Constitution. Articles 56 to 61 of the 1996 Constitution outlines a general regime applicable to all regions, while defining in Article 62 a derogatory regime taking into consideration the special status of some regions in their organisation and functioning.  Hence the special status was applicable to the North West and South West Regions since the entry into force of the 2019 Law on the General Code of Regional and Local Authorities (the 2019 Decentralisation Code).

A well-organised decentralisation system warrants mechanisms for the supervision and monitoring of lower spheres of government. Nonetheless, in order to avoid political usurpation of powers by the central administration, constitution drafters need to build safeguards in the constitution.  The 1996 Constitution has no exhaustive chapter on supervision, monitoring and intergovernmental relations. These are therefore provided for in particular by secondary legislation with the main legislation being the 2019 General Code on Decentralisation. With respect to supervision, under the directives of the President, the minister in charge of decentralisation and local development, as well as the state representative in the concerned region or division, shall supervise the decentralisation process therein.  The main supervisory authority in the region, appointed, is the Governor. The Prefect or SDO exercises the state’s supervisory authority over councils.  The Governors and Prefects therefore represent the President in their respective administrative units.  As representatives of the President of the Republic, the Government and each of the ministers; the Governor and the Prefect are the only authorities empowered to represent the State before the deliberative organs of local authorities, council unions and management bodies of establishments of local authorities.

Administrative decisions issued by regional and local authorities such as the president of the regional council and the mayor are sent to the state representative for his or her approval. Administrative decisions include deliberations over issues such as the awarding of public service contracts as well as land issues.   In an eventuality where the state representative unduly rejects an administrative decision from the president of the regional council or the mayor, such an authority may, on the grounds of abuse of power, challenge such an administrative authority before a competent administrative court. 

Monitoring a decentralisation process is significant for the effective and efficient realisation of objectives such as development, democracy, and the management of diversity issues and ethnic conflicts. The core law on monitoring decentralisation is still the 2019 General Code on Decentralisation. Other legal instruments that focus on such monitoring include Decree No. 2008/013 of 17 January 2008 on the Composition and Functioning of the National Decentralisation Board (2008 Decree of the Decentralisation Board) and Decree No. 2008/014 of 11 January 2008 on the Composition and Functioning of the Inter-ministerial Committee on Local Services (2008 Decree on the Inter-ministerial Committee). The National Decentralisation Board (the Board) is responsible for the follow-up and evaluation of the decentralisation process. Specifically, it is mandated with the responsibility of forwarding an annual report on the state of progress of the decentralisation process and the functioning of local services to the President of the Republic. It is equally mandated, furthermore, to propose recommendations on the annual allocation of resources and competences to decentralised local entities. 

An Inter-ministerial Committee on Local Services (the Committee) is under the authority of the minister in charge of decentralisation and local development. It is in charge of preparing and follow-up of competences and the utilisation of resources to be transferred to decentralised local collectivities.  The Chairman of the Committee is the minister of decentralisation and local development. There is equally the provision of a National Committee on Local Finance responsible especially for the optimum mobilisation of revenue of local authorities as well as for the sound management of local funds. 

It is crucial to note that both the Board and the Committee are supposed to make sure that decentralisation is carried out effectively, especially in terms of the process supporting the equitable peace and development of impoverished areas. These structures also have the responsibility in ensuring that issues such as ethnicity, minority and diversity concerns are incorporated into the decentralisation agenda. However, they simply extend the powers of the executive and operate as deconcentrated units. What is worrisome again here is that all these structures charged with supervising and monitoring the decentralisation process are mainly composed of authorities nominated by central government with very limited chances given for the views of other stakeholders, the community or even local government. Their duties overlap, leading to corruption and a waste of finances.

On the important issue of organised local government, Part VII of the 2019 Decentralised Code focuses on decentralised cooperation, groupings and partnerships. In this respect, organised local government or decentralised cooperation is feasible where there is an agreement between two or more councils, especially when they decide to merge their different resources with an aim of attaining common objectives. Such a cooperation may be carried out between Cameroonian councils or between Cameroonian councils and councils of foreign states. 

In a bid to attain inter-council cooperation, councils of the same division or region may, by at least a two-thirds majority of the decision of each council, create a union.  Such a council union shall be set up by agreement by the mayors of the concerned councils.  The bodies of the council union shall be composed of a union board and a union chairman.  There happens to be also inter-regional cooperation. Inter-regional solidarity warrants that or more regions, on the initiative of their respective presidents, may reach an understanding between themselves on matters of common regional interest included in their missions. 

Some states have constitutionally entrenched such cooperative governance and consultative mechanisms; some have put in place institutions to oversee cooperative governance and others have developed it through practice. Chapter 3 of the Constitution of South Africa lays emphases on cooperation, and has even gone further to put in place the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 13 of 2005 which governs the functioning of district intergovernmental forums and the functioning of the technical support structures controlling political intergovernmental structures as well as the functioning of the provincial premiers’ intergovernmental forums. 

The United Councils and Cities of Cameroon (UCCC) is an association formed by the councils and cities in Cameroon in 2003. The UCCC was created from the merger of the Cameroon Association of Towns and the Cameroon Union of Towns and Councils.  In reality the UCCC has not been effective in playing a part in the development of councils because serious disparities continue to exist in terms of development among councils. There therefore is a need for Cameroon to follow the example of South Africa, of which the most salient features were set out earlier, for effective organised local government.

Chofor Che CA is Technical Adviser no 2 at the National School of Local Administration , Buea, Cameroon. He is co-founder of CACLiTA. He holds a PhD (Law) obtained from the Centre for Human Rights, Faculty of Law, South Africa. In 2023, he was guest researcher at the Institute of Federalism , Faculty of Law, University of Fribourg, Switzerland. He has served before as Divisional Officer in Cameroon (appointed by the President of the Republic) and consulted for several international institutions.


Posted by on April 24, 2023 in Uncategorized


Our basic right to express a view — Local Government Magazine

By Peter Dunne During the first Covid lockdown the Government cleverly and skilfully used the tactic of ‘inclusion’ to build support for its initiatives and marginalise its critics. 965 more words

Our basic right to express a view — Local Government Magazine
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Posted by on April 11, 2023 in Uncategorized


The Case Against Zero Hunger and the Sustainable Development Goals — State (of) Development

With 2016 just around the corner, we are mere days away from getting started on the next set of development goals, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). I have been able to follow the long consultation process that led up to their adoption in bits and pieces, through a conference in Seoul in 2012 and some […]

The Case Against Zero Hunger and the Sustainable Development Goals — State (of) Development
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Posted by on April 11, 2023 in Uncategorized


Where to Zimbabwe? Another stage set for flawed elections under Mnangagwa’s leadership — AfricLaw

Author: Nqobani Nyathi Doctoral Candidate and Project Officer, Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria In 2018, and perhaps at the peak of his popularity, Emmerson Mnangagwa narrowly won a disputed Presidential election in Zimbabwe. In the aftermath, chaos ensued, and soldiers shot and killed people. No one has been held accountable so far, perpetuating […]

Where to Zimbabwe? Another stage set for flawed elections under Mnangagwa’s leadership — AfricLaw
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Posted by on April 11, 2023 in Uncategorized


The need for institutional and political means to estop the precarious tampering with Constitutions of African states, by Chofor Che

CACLiTA Cameroon

The revision or modification of state constitutions is important especially if of utmost necessity to the betterment of the state, but there has been a precarious tampering of the fundamental provisions of constitutions in Africa. The case of Burkina Faso which has been plunged into political turmoil, to the recent case of Togo, are glaring examples. Interestingly, constitutional provisions related to the term of office of Heads of state have been modified so as to extend the term of office of these leaders in power. Is it that there are no legal and institutional measures in place to prevent these leaders and their regimes from manipulating fundamental provisions of state constitutions? Are there no political parameters that can be put in place so as to prevent these leaders from manipulating fundamental provisions of state constitutions?

In most African State Constitutions like the Constitutions of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon…

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Posted by on October 26, 2020 in Uncategorized

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